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 Holism, Individualism, and the Units of Selection'
 Elliott Sober
 University of Wisconsin, Madison
 1. Holism and Individualism
 The units of selection problem, as it is discussed within evolution-
 ary theory, recapitulates some important elements in the dispute be-
 tween methodological holism and methodological individualism. Holism
 and individualism have for a long time occupied favored positions in
 the stable of old warhorses owned and operated by philosophers of so-
 cial science. These particular old warhorses are thought by many to be
 in retirement, although there is less than universal agreement about
 whether holism or individualism won the battle. Part of the point I
 will make about group versus individual selection is that biologists
 would do well not to emulate certain aspects of the holism/individual-
 ism controversy. That they have done so already is a point that I
 will attempt to establish. And, conversely, the substantive empirical
 issues involved in the units of selection controversy suggest that the
 holism/individualism debate within the social sciences can be reformu-
 lated in a way that makes it nontrivial and also not decidable a priori.
 This offers some hope that the holism/individualism dispute need not
 remain a dismal philosophical problem of the "dismal sciences".
 Holists and individualists disagree over whether social wholes are
 more than the sum of their parts (see Brodbeck [1968] for representa-
 tive essays). Holists say they are and individualists say they are
 not. There is the appearance of a disagreement here. But the appear-
 ance starts to appear illusory when one asks what each side means by
 "sum"; exactly what is meant when it is asserted, or denied, that the
 whole is more than the sum of its parts?
 Holists are concerned to avoid the sin of atomism. They do not
 think that social entities can be understood by taking individuals in
 isolation from each other. To understand social wholes, they insist,
 one must consider individuals in their relationship to each other and
 to the environment. When holists assert that the whole is more than
 PSA 1980, Volume 2, pp. 93-121
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 the sum of its parts, they mean that properties of the whole are not
 determined by the unary, nonrelational, properties of the parts. To
 me, the point that holists are making is a truism. That relational
 properties must be taken into account seems obvious. It looks like
 this point is true, not just of social objects, but of any object which
 has parts. One might even suspect that the principle is a priori, or
 as a priori as anything can be.
 Do individualists seriously propose to ignore relations? Are indi-
 vidualists really such benighted atomists? Not at all, say the indivi-
 dualists, who insist they not be confused with the straw man just dis-
 cussed. Individualists concede that social facts cannot be understood
 by taking individuals in isolation from each other. But the crucial
 point is that the character of the whole is fixed by the properties and
 relations of its parts. The whole is nothing above and beyond those
 interactions among individuals. Individualists will deny being atom-
 ists. What accusation might they hurl back at the holists? Holists,
 they say, hypostatize (reify) social wholes. Holists, according to
 this indictment, think that properties of social wholes are not deter-
 mined by the interactions that individuals have with each other and
 with the environment. Where, then, does this independent existence of
 social wholes come from? What is the secret added ingredient one must
 add to individuals, the environment, and their interactions to get
 social facts? Holism, thus construed, looks like old-fashioned vital-
 ism; it isn't that some mysterious fluid must be added to matter to
 get life. Rather, holism is portrayed as holding that you must add
 some sort of occult social fluid to individuals and their interactions
 to get social groups.
 This time it is the individualists who seem to be right. Reifica-
 tion is precisely what holists are up to, if they believe that the
 whole is not determined by its parts and their interactions with each
 other and the environment. Individualism does seem to be correct in
 claiming that properties of wholes are determined by properties of
 parts, in this sense.
 So what has happened to this dismal dispute? One could embrace
 atomism on the one hand or hypostatis on the other, and doubtless
 there have been social scientists who have done so, in practice if not
 in theory. But if one rejects both of these alternatives, there seems
 to be no issue left. Yes, in one sense, the whole is more than the
 sum of its parts, but, in another sense, no, it is not. What else is
 there to talk about?
 I will mention three problems which retain their interest in the
 face of these truisms. The first is epistemological. One can agree
 with the truisms and still wonder what the most fruitful research
 strategy might be in understanding a particular social phenomenon.
 Even if the truisms are true, it is still an open question what facts
 would be most interesting to look at in trying to understand the stock
 market crash of 1929; this social fact may be managable from a macro-
 scopic perspective and completely intractable from a more individualist
This content downloaded from 128.104.46.196 on Sat, 30 Jun 2018 17:53:44 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 95
 point of view (see Sober 1980 for the relevance of this distinction to
 the biological species concept). A second sort of question, also un-
 touched by the truisms, concerns the amount of complexity and interac-
 tion among parts that needs to be taken into account to explain social
 facts. Historically the difference between self-styled holists and
 self-styled individualists has often concerned this question; the issue
 has not been whether the whole is reducible to the interaction of its
 parts, but in what ways the determination works (Wimsatt 1980 argues
 the centrality of this issue to the units of selection problem). A
 third question which is not addressed by the truisms can be grasped by
 distinguishing type from token.2 What I have been discussing so far is
 the way in which single social events, like the stock market crash of
 1929, are the upshot of interactions among individuals. That is, I
 have been talking about token social facts. A rather different ques-
 tion concerns the nature of various kinds of social facts. Here, one
 asks not for an explanation of a particular historical event, but of
 the nature of a social property. What is capitalism? What is a stock
 market crash? These questions about types may or may not be answerable
 in terms of individuals and their interactions. I raise these three
 questions only to set them to one side.
 The truisms, then, do not concern how we might best attempt to under-
 stand a particular social fact, but concern that fact's causal connec-
 tions with the world of individuals. The truisms do not concern the
 character of social properties, like the nature of crises or production
 in general, but the causality of single token events, like the stock
 market crash of 1929. Each whole is determined by interactions among
 its parts. This truism would be vouchsafed if causality were transi-
 tive. I'll assume that it is.3 The stock market crash was caused, we
 might suppose, by interactions among various market conditions, which
 were themselves social facts. These social facts, in turn, obtained
 because various individuals did what they did in various physical en-
 vironments. So the interactions among people caused the crash. If
 this is right, then it is an ill-conceived question which asks: *What
 caused the crash -- was it the market conditions or was it the way
 people acted?" One should respond to this question by asking: "What are
 you saying or for?" There is no asymmetry here. Causality, in virtue
 of its transitivity, gives aid and comfort neither to the holist nor to
 the individualist. The causal chain just keeps rolling along.
 In what follows, it will be argued that the dispute about the units
 of selection resembles the holism/individualism dispute, but with the
 concept of natural selection replacing the more general idea of caus-
 ality. This replacement makes all the difference in the world, however.
 Holists and individualists are, or should be, driven to disgruntled
 agreement by considerations that are not specifically sociological and
 appear to be almost a priori (like the fact that causality is transi-
 tive). In contrast, group selection and individual selection hypoth-
 eses admit of no such easy resolution; this dispute, properly con-
 strued, turns out to be an interesting empirical and specifical'ly bio-
 logical one. What is more, the lack of asymmetries just noted, when
 a question of social versus individual causation is broached, are
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 replaced by asymmetries aplenty. It is a very real question to ask
 "Was a particular social characteristic caused by group or by indivi-
 dual selection?"
 2. Historical and Conceptual Background
 I just argued that holists and individualists interpret the clich'e
 "the whole is more than the sum of its parts" in two different ways. The
 interpretations given a priori bias the case: holists interpret the
 slogan in such a way that it cannot fail to be true, whereas individu-
 alists tend to understand it in such a way that it cannot fail to be
 false. This same situation obtains, in much less virulent form, in the
 unit of selection controversy. I will address here the dispute between
 group and organismic selectionists, leaving to one side the issues
 raised concerning genic and molecular selection at one end of the spec-
 trum, and interspecies and community selection at the other (although
 a brief comment will be made about this in section 6). Authors who be-
 lieve that group selection has played a relatively minor role in evolu-
 tion tend to use a definition of group selection that is extremely re-
 strictive; authors who attribute greater potential importance to this
 selective force often use a more liberal, permissive, conception of
 group selection. What is more, each position has fairly cogent criti-
 cisms of some of the ideas on the other side.
 The philosophical focus of this paper is on determining what group
 selection is; the hope is that we can then use this clarification to
 pinpoint what distinguishes group and individual processes generally.
 Yet, it is well to remember that biologists do not have this as their
 motivation for thinking about group selection, nor did they become in-
 terested in group selection as an idle conceptual exercise. The his-
 torical context for the recent incarnation of the group selection con-
 troversy is that group selection was hypothesized as an explanation of
 phenomena that allegedly could not be explained in any other way. In
 1962, V. C. Wynne-Edwards published his book Animal Dispersion in Rela-
 tion to Social Behavior. There, he argued that certain adaptations
 found in nature would be counterpredicted if individual selection were
 the only selective force at work. Wynne-Edwards talked about the ways
 in which prey populations react to the approach of predators. He dis-
 cussed territoriality. He devoted a great deal of attention to the
 idea that organisms limit their own reproduction when the population
 approaches the environment's carrying capacity. Each of these cate-
 gories involves traits which he thought were altruistic: organisms
 possessing such traits diminished their own reproductive chances while
 enhancing the fitness of the group. Altruism is always at a disadvan-
 tage when compared with selfishness, as far as individual selection is
 concerned. But groups of altruists may do better than groups of self-
 ish individuals, and this, Wynne-Edwards argued, explains why altruism
 is such a common and stable phenomenon in nature.
 Four years later, George C. Williams published his Adaptation and
 Natural Selection. Williams subjected group selection to two lines of
 attack. First, he looked at the alleged examples of altruism that
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 Wynne-Edwards had discussed and argued that they could be analyzed
 differently. Sentinel crows issue alarm cries when a predator ap-
 proaches. Wynne-Edwards saw this as an example of altruism; the sentinel
 places itself in peril for the good of the group. But a number of al-
 ternative, individualist, construals can be offered: perhaps the sen-
 tinel's warnings benefit its own offspring more than they benefit unre-
 lated individuals. If so, the issuing of warning cries is, like paren-
 tal care, perfectly consistent with the selfish calculus of individual
 selection. Or perhaps, though the warning cries are heard by related
 and unrelated individuals alike, the accoustical properties of the cry
 do not expose the sentinel to increased risk; maybe predators can't
 localize them. Or, perhaps the cries have the effect of causing a
 flurry of activity in the flock, and thereby conceal the sentinel from
 the approaching predator.
 The occurrences of "perhaps" above deserve notice. The empirical
 details of sentinel crows, and of the other phenomena that Williams and
 Wynne-Edwards discuss, are incompletely understood. What Williams was
 doing was not providing known facts which, in every instance, refuted
 Wynne-Edwards' suggestions. Rather, he was telling an alternative story
 which was capable of explaining the observations from the point of view
 of individual selection alone. So given our paucity of details about
 sentinel crows and the other examples that Wynne-Edwards and Williams
 discuss, we might say that there are two possible explanations, at
 least, of the observations. One of them is provided by Wynne-Edwards'
 group selection hypothesis, the other by Williams' individual selection
 hypothesis. Do we have here a stand-off? According to Williams, we
 do not, since it is more parsimonious, he says, to invoke individual
 selection alone to account for these controversial cases.
 Since I have discussed the principle of parsimony and its applica-
 tion to the group selection controversy elsewhere (1981b), I will not go
 into a great deal of detail in discussing the merits of such arguments
 in general or of Williams' argument in particular. However, a few com-
 ments are in order. One, not uncommon, reaction to Williams' parsimony
 argument is to dismiss it in such a way as to imply that considerations
 of parsimony never count for anything. As one biologist said to me:
 "The fact that Williams doesn't need group selection has nothing to do
 with whether group selection exists." If the thought behind this re-
 mark were true, then Ockham's razor would be a purely aesthetic consid-
 eration, never offering us a reason for thinking that a given hypothe-
 sis is true.
 I do not take this wholly negative view of Williams' parsimony ar-
 gument, although there can be no doubt that parsimony alone does not
 place individual selection on a thoroughly satisfying theoretical basis.
 One of the limitations of parsimony arguments in general is that they
 do not offer us an explanation of why the parsimonious hypothesis is
 true. Maybe we ought to believe that individual selection better ac-
 counts for the phenomena that Wynne-Edwards discussed. But this does
 not explain why group selection has played so minor a role in the his-
 tory of evolution. Sewall Wright (1978) discusses this point. He suggested
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 to place the subject on a more secure foundation, we must create quanti-
 tative models of group selection, determine under what parameter val-
 ues group selection would be efficacious, and then go to nature to see
 when, if ever, those parameter values are satisfied. Then we would
 have a more substantial reason for being parsimonious; we also would
 have an explanation of why group selection never, or rarely, occurs.
 I believe that this limitation of parsimony arguments has the curi-
 ous result of revealing why they can have a rational basis. Parsimony
 arguments are inductive arguments. Induction from a sample to a con-
 taining population does not provide one with an explanation of why the
 containing population is as it is. Williams wanted to explain the con-
 troversial phenomena over which he and Wynne-Edwards differed in a way
 in which everyone agreed the noncontroversial phenomena were to be ex-
 plained. What was uncontroversial (at least to the participants in
 this dispute) was that individual selection was the mechanism behind
 numerous adaptations. Williams' parsimony argument was simply the as-
 sertion that we should use old mechanisms to explain new phenomena.
 Since the sampled, already understood, adaptations were due to indivi-
 dual selection, we infer that the new cases at issue are caused by the
 same thing.
 Inductive arguments, I assume, can, if they are any good, provide us
 with reasons for believing their conclusions. So the issue of the qual-
 ity of Williams' parsimony argument reduces to the issue of whether his
 inductive argument is strong. Are the known cases representative of
 the kinds of adaptations found in nature, or do they involve a biased
 sample? This and other questions are suggested by Wright's (1978) eval-
 uation of the parsimony argument. What they show is that parsimony ar-
 guments can provide us with reasons, if they meet the standards of good
 induction. But even when they do this, they are always incomplete,
 from the point of view of a science which has explanation as a goal.
 As I mentioned above, Williams offered a second line of argument
 which is supposed to count against the importance of group selection.
 This involved quantitative considerations based on Fisher's (1930) so-
 called Fundamental Theorem of Natural Selection. The upshot of these
 considerations (also discussed in Lewontin 1970) is that group selec-
 tion will probably play a restricted, and relatively minor, role in the
 history of evolution, when compared with individual selection. These
 quantitative arguments do not show that group selection never exists,
 or that it couldn't exist. As we'll see, Williams believed that at
 least one real case of group selection has probably been found in nature,
 in any case. Although these quantitative considerations are separable
 from our goal of describing what group selection is, the definition we
 will arrive at has some ramifications for the quantitative question.
 Wynne-Edwards' work and Williams' attack were followed by a series of
 theoretical papers (reviewed in Wade 1978) in which mathematical models
 were proposed and examined. The main result of these analyses has ap-
 peared to confirm Williams' orientation, in that the parameter values
 needed for group selection to have significant impact were generally
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 found to be quite restrictive. This conclusion, however, has not gone
 unchallenged, in that it is arguable that the models contain several
 unrealistic assumptions that a priori bias the case against group selec-
 tion (Wade 1978). In my opinion, the quantitative question remains
 open.
 As I have indicated, our interest here is not in the issue of how
 much of a difference group selection has made, but rather in the ques-
 tion of what group selection is. The various arguments and approaches
 that have fueled the biological controversy suggest that some rather
 different conceptions of group selection have been at work. Before
 we can identify these points of divergence, however, we ought to be
 clear on the common conceptual structure which is not in dispute.
 For natural selection to act on a set of objects, there must be
 variation -- the objects must be different. Moreover, the differences
 between the objects must include differences in their probabilities of
 reproductive success -- there must be variation in fitness. And lastly,
 it usually is assumed that the fitness of parents must be correlated
 with the fitness of offspring -- there must be heritable variation in
 fitness (adapted from Lewontin 1970). This last requirement seems to
 me to be inessential for the existence of natural selection, although
 it is essential if cumulative genetic evolution by means of natural se-
 lection is to take place.
 A word of clarification is in order concerning how the concept of
 fitness will be understood here. In any model of evolutionary pro-
 cesses which accords a role to random drift, fitness cannot be defined
 as actual reproductive success (e.g., number of viable offspring).
 Since any realistic model must give drift its due, fitness is not iden-
 tical with actual reproductive success. The so-called tautology of
 the survival of the fittest is no tautology at all; the fitter do not
 always turn out to be more successful. The natural reaction to this
 fact is to think of fitness as an expectation, in the mathematical
 sense, of reproductive success (see, e.g., Crow and Kimura 1970, p.
 178, Mills and Beatty 1979, and Soberl981a for discussion). The fit-
 ness of an object is its propensity, or disposition, to be reproduc-
 tively successful. Fitness differences, thus construed, may be the
 causes of reproductive differences.
 The conditions set out above for natural selection to act on a set
 of objects -- namely that the objects should vary in fitness -- require
 supplementation to avoid the following problem. Consider a set of or-
 ganisms which are causally isolated from each other; they may be at
 opposite ends of the universe and experience entirely different kinds
 of environmental stress. Suppose they are different in their fitness
 values. Still, it would be odd to conclude that there is a selection
 process in which they are all involved. One solution to this problem
 is to require that the objects be in competition with each other. But,
 as Lewontin (1978) has argued, this is inessential; two bacterial
 strains may be subject to natural selection even when neither impinges
 on the other's access to resources. The strains, growing in an excess
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 of nutrient broth, may have unlimited energy available, but selection
 may favor the strain with the faster division time. As Darwin remarked,
 "A plant at the edge of the desert is said to struggle for life against
 the drought." By implication, selection can favor the plant better
 suited to the desert conditions, even when the better and worse plants
 do not interfere with each other. To be sure, competition is a famil-
 iar way of thinking about natural selection; yet, curiously, the famil-
 iar cases of natural selection that serve as textbook examples do not
 involve competition. The evolution of industrial melanism and of im-
 munity to DDT do not involve there being a common resource in short
 supply. Competition is a special case, not a defining characteristic,
 of natural selection.
 A more general conception of what subsumes a set of objects under a
 single selection process is that there must be some common causal in-
 fluence acting on the objects which affects their reproductive chances.
 This common influence I will call a force. Much latitude exists for
 determining whether two objects are subject to the same force. It may
 be appropriate to think of the organisms in geographically isolated
 local populations of the same species as all involved in a single selec-
 tion process. If each experiences predation as its major environmental
 problem, this may suffice to say that they are exposed to the same
 force. If, however, some experience predation, others experience temp-
 erature fluctuation, and still others experience the disappearance of
 prey as the major environmental stress, it will be wrong to lump these
 organisms together and talk about a single selection process subsuming
 them all. The sameness of the forces impinging on different organisms
 will be determined not just by the physical characteristics of the en-
 vironment, but also by the biology of the organisms involved. If a
 field is sprayed with one insecticide, and a second field is sprayed
 with a second insecticide, it may be perfectly correct to construe the
 two affected insect populations as part of the same selection process.
 This will be true if the physical differences in the insecticides
 make no difference in the way those chemicals impinge on the organisms.
 The idea of "sameness of force" needs to be read biologically.4
 So far, I have talked about a set of objects satisfying certain con-
 ditions. What are these objects? How should the abstract structure of
 these conditions be interpreted? The classical, Darwinian, interpre-
 tation is that the objects are organisms that exist within the same
 population. Organismic, or individual, selection is generally under-
 stood as this sort of within group selection. Group selection, on the
 other hand, involves interpreting the structure so that the objects in-
 volved are groups. Groups differ in their capacity to contribute to
 the next generation. Group reproduction is here understood to require
 the founding of numerically distinct colonies; mere growth in size of
 the group isn't enough. So, to get started in considering what group
 selection is, imagine a set of groups which differ from each other in
 their expectations of reproductive success. Group selection will
 thereby involve selection between groups, whereas individual selection
 involves selection within groups.
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 3. The Artefact Argument
 Can one define group selection in the way just suggested, as exist-
 ing whenever there is heritable variation in the fitnesses of groups?
 I would say not, although some biologists have used this sort of per-
 missive characterization. The defect of the definition is that dif-
 ferences in reproductive capacity that obtain between groups may merely
 be artefacts of the differences in fitness that obtain between organ-
 isms. Williams (1966) again and again deploys this idea in criticizing
 group selection hypotheses. The fact that natural selection has the
 effect that some groups are more reproductively successful than others
 is not enough to show that one has group selection. Selection at lower
 levels of organization can have this sort of "macroscopic" upshot.
 Williams' artefact argument, as I will call it, asserts that the
 mere existence of differences in group productivity, or in group fit-
 ness, is not enough to demonstrate that there is group selection. The
 crucial question is where those differences came from: are they an ar-
 tefact of selection processes occurring at other levels, or are they
 due to selection occurring at the level of groups? The distinction
 being made here must be spelled out in an adequate characterization of
 what group selection is.5
 This line of thinking has its counterpart in the methodological
 holist versus methodological individualist controversy. Suppose holists
 argued that their position is confirmed by the fact that some social
 event, like the stock market crash of 1929, was caused by the occurrence
 of certain market conditions, which are themselves social events and
 states of affairs. Individualists might grant the causal claim, but
 argue that this by no means argues in favor of holism. After all, it
 still is possible, and indeed is to be expected, that individual inter-
 actions brought about those very market conditions. That social facts
 are causally efficacious does not show that their causal efficacy is
 irreducible. Individualists will often demand to be shown how social
 facts can exist without an individualist foundation. Williams, in his
 criticisms of group selection hypotheses, demands to be shown cases in
 which the causation of group properties is not reducible to individual
 selection.
 Let's illustrate how the artefact argument works with a simple ex-
 ample. Imagine a system of populations, each of which is internally
 homogeneous with respect to height. All the individuals in population
 #1 are 1 foot tall, all those in population #2 are 2 feet tall, and so
 on, for six such populations. Now imagine that natural selection favors
 individuals which are taller over ones which are shorter. As a result,
 population #6 will be more reproductively successful than population #5,
 and so on. Is this a case of group selection? I doubt that many biolo-
 gists would want to say that it is, and I am certain that Williams' ar-
 tefact argument entails that it is not. What one has here is a case
 in which the differential reproductive success of groups is an artefact
 of differences in individual fitness. Group selection isn't to be
 equated with there being heritable variation in the fitnesses of groups.6
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 One of the assumptions underlying Williams' artefact argument is
 that group selection and individual selection are objectively distinct
 forces of evolution; in the above case, the group selection description
 is false while the individual selection description is true. Now it is
 conceivable that one might give up this assumption and view the con-
 cepts of group and individual selection as interchangable and equiva-
 lent, the way that some positivists have viewed the relationship between
 Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometry. In this vein, one might hold
 that whenever there is heritable variation in the fitness of groups,
 you can say that there is group selection or not, as you please. The
 choice would be one of convenience, in that both descriptions would be
 correct. According to this view, group selection and individual selec-
 tion are not related to each other the way that mutation and migration
 are related to each other, namely, as two objectively distinct observer-
 independent forces of evolution.
 Actually, this "conventionalist" attitude is not just conceivable,
 but is suggested by one of the oldest and most influential models of
 group selection, that of Sewall Wright (1931). Wright postulated a
 system of semi-isolated local populations. In virtue of their small
 size, random drift has more chance to operate, so that an allele might
 drift to a sufficiently high frequency for individual selection to take
 over and then drive the trait to fixation. The population would then
 send out migrants who would make over other local populations by the
 same process. Is this group selection? Well, it can be described as
 a case in which one has drift acting on individuals within a population,
 individual selection, and migration of individuals. One could, I sup-
 pose, define group selection as existing whenever these three indivi-
 dual-level processes occur. But then group selection is not a distinct
 evolutionary force, and Williams' artefact argument cannot be made.
 4. Context Sensitivity of Fitness
 How are we to strengthen our definition of group selection? What
 more is there to group selection beyond there being heritable variation
 in the fitness of groups? One natural suggestion is this: if the
 change in gene frequency one gets would not have happened if one had a
 single panmictic population, then one has group selection. That is,
 returning to our example of the populations distinguished by the heights
 of their inhabitants, we get this result: if the differential repro-
 ductive success that obtains in this situation differs from what would
 have happened if there had been a single interbreeding population made
 up of all the individuals, then we've got group selection. The idea
 here, which has obvious application to Wright's model, is that group
 selection exists whenever population structure affects reproductive
 success. A central point of Wright's model was to show how a system of
 small semi-isolated local populations could undergo evolutionary
 changes that would be extremely improbable in the kind of large panmic-
 tic population that R. A. Fisher (1930) considered.
 Is this an adequate definition? Can one say that group selection
 exists whenever there is heritable variation in the fitness of groups,
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 where those fitness values depend on population structure? I'll set to
 one side the problem of figuring out the character of the counterfactual
 situation we are supposed to consider; if the groups exist in different
 environments, what are we to imagine is the environment that the hypo-
 thetical single panmictic population occupies? This problem aside, it
 seems clear that the proposed definition is extremely liberal, in that
 it makes group selection a commonplace of evolution. It is a virtually
 universal fact about fitness that an organism's fitness depends on what
 the other organisms are like in the population. Thus, whenever one has
 a system of populations, one can expect individual fitnesses to depend
 in part on the way in which organisms are distributed into populations.
 In particular, one can expect the fitness values to differ from what
 they would be if there were a single panmictic population. Does this
 suffice for group selection? I would say not; group selection must in-
 volve more than the fact that fitness values are context sensitive.
 Let me report a classic finding concerning this fact of context sen-
 sitivity. Levene, Pavlovsky, and Dobzhansky (1954) found that the so-
 called Arrowhead homozygote on the third chromosome of Drosophila
 pseudoobscura is fitter than the Chiricahua homozygote, under labora-
 tory conditions in which just these two chromosome types competed. How-
 ever, when a selection experiment was run in which Arrowhead and Chiri-
 cahua competed with the Standard chromosome type, Arrowhead turned out
 to be less fit than Chiricahua. This showed how relative fitness of a
 trait can depend, not just on the physical environment of the population,
 but on what other traits are present in the population itself. Now
 imagine two population cages, one containing Arrowhead and Standard, the
 other containing Chiricahua and Standard. Fitness values in the two pair-
 wise competitions would be different from what would obtain if Arrow-
 head, Chiricahua, and Standard were all present in a single population.
 But that there would be a difference in no way implies that the two
 pair-wise competitions involve group selection. Group selection must
 involve more than the idea that the fitness values of organisms is in-
 fluenced by the kind of groups they are in.7
 A parallel line of argument can be traced in the holism/individual-
 ism dispute. Holists sometimes argue for their position by citing cases
 in which the properties of individuals are influenced by the groups to
 which they belong. We will see later on that certain situations of
 this kind can be crucial for confirming holism; however, the mere fact
 that the properties of individuals are context sensitive does not win
 the day against individualism. For the individualist will simply point
 out that the group properties which shape the character of individuals
 are themselves the product of individuals and their interactions.
 Again, if one is unwilling to hypostatize groups, the individualist's
 assertion cannot be faulted. For the point being made is simply that
 the context sensitivity of individual properties -- the way in which
 they depend on group context -- is perfectly consistent with indivi-
 duals being the material basis for all higher-level phenomena.
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 5. Altruism
 So far, I have examined two rather permissive definitions of group
 selection and argued that they are inadequate. I argued for their in-
 adequacy by taking seriously Williams' artefact argument. Group selec-
 tion is not to be identified with there being heritable variation in
 the fitness of groups; nor should it be identified with there being
 heritable variation in the fitness of groups where organismic fitness
 is context sensitive. Neither of these conditions is sufficient for
 group selection.
 In each of the two proposals, it was found that alleged cases of
 group selection could be analyzed in terms of individual-level proces-
 ses alone. This is a standard ploy that individualists use to combat
 the arguments of holists. A natural response by holists to this line
 of argument is to try to find some social fact which would be counter-
 predicted by the assumptions of individualism. If this could be found,
 then the individualists' strategy of assimilating the phenomenon into
 their own framework would be blocked. Although phenomena which indi-
 vidualists can accommodate may not count as "real" group processes,
 ones that they cannot accommodate will qualify as paradigm cases of
 what holism is all about.
 This thought may lead us back to the issue which fueled the fires of
 the group selection dispute initially. Altruism is counterpredicted by
 individual selection.8 Group selection however, might be supposed to
 promote the existence of altruism, since groups which contain altruists
 may fare better than ones which do not. So, if one wants to argue for
 the efficacy of group selection, what better phenomenon to look for
 than cases in which altruism has emerged and remained prevalent owing
 to natural selection? Let us be careful here. There are two roles
 which the concept of altruism might be taken to play in the idea of
 group selection. One of them concerns how a biologist might try to dis-
 cover cases of group selection: look for altruism. The other concerns
 what group selection is (not how we might find out about it); on this
 view, group selection must be selection for altruism. The difference
 here is that between an epistemological and an ontological considera-
 tion.
 The ontological thesis, that group selection must work in a direction
 opposite to that of individual selection, has one virtue. It has the
 clear implication that group selection is objectively distinct from in-
 dividual-level forces like individual selection. It thereby cannot be
 criticized by invoking Williams' artefact argument; the typical indivi-
 dualist ploy of reanalyzing alleged group-level phenomena as artefacts
 of individual-level processes has been forestalled.
 So, does group selection have to involve selection for altruism? Be-
 fore considering some biological examples which show that it need not, I
 want to note a rather abstract oddity of this idea. It implies that if
 there is group selection at work on a system of populations, individual
 selection must be acting as well. That is, we would have here a force
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 of evolution which could not act alone. This, by itself, is not a con-
 clusive reason for rejecting the idea, but it does show the proposed
 definition to conflict with a rather plausible requirement on evolu-
 tionary forces, and, perhaps, on all forces in general. It should be
 possible to describe the changes a force would bring about, if there
 were no other forces at work. That is, one might suppose that the use
 of the ceteris paribus condition is not merely permitted when it comes
 to describing a force, but that it is necessary for the adequate descrip-
 tion of a force that this be possible. This corresponds to the idea
 that a force should be isolatable in principle. I do not propose to
 defend this idea of isolatability, but merely note that it is rather
 standard fare in our conception of force. If group selection requires
 selection for altruism, this condition cannot be satisfied.
 But the decisive reason for rejecting this view of group selection
 is more down to earth and biological. It is simply that some cases
 which seem clearly to be ones of group selection involve group and or-
 ganismic selection acting in the same direction. A proper conception
 of group selection should be tailored to allow for this fact. Let me
 describe two examples, one of them being the sole case believed by
 Williams to be a real instance of group selection. Here I mean the in-
 vestigation by Lewontin and Dunn (1960) of the segregator distorter t-
 allele in the house mouse Mus musculus.
 Let me give an elementary description of how the process of segrega-
 tion distortion, or meiotic drive, works (see Crow 1979 for details).
 Diploid organisms are ones whose chromosomes come in pairs. In the
 formation of sex cells, these pairs of chromosomes separate, so that
 sperms and eggs contain one chromosome each from each pair -- they are
 haploid. The normal pattern for this reduction is that 50% of the sex
 cells contain one chromosome and 50% the other, from each homologous
 pair. But when a segregator distorter allele is present on a chromo-
 some, it "subverts" this equality of representation and secures for it-
 self representation of greater than 50%.
 This is what the t-allele does in the house mouse. Consider the
 males who are heterozygote for the t-allele. One might expect that
 50% of the sperm pool of this group would be made of gametes contain-
 ing the t-allele. In fact, the representation of the segregator dis-
 torter is 85%. So at this level there is strong selective pressure
 favoring chromosomes which contain the t-allele. Let us call this
 chromosomal selection. Chromosomes having the trait are at an advan-
 tage over ones lacking it.
 If we go up a level or two, from chromosomes to organisms, the t-
 allele is not favored by selection. Males who are homozygous for the
 t-allele are sterile. So there is strong organismic selection working
 against the t-allele.
 Lewontin and Dunn combined this information about the chromosomal
 and organismic selection acting on the t-allele and derived a predic-
 tion of what the frequency of the t-allele should be in nature. It
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 was wrong; the prediction erred by being too high. This suggested to
 them that some third force was acting against the t-allele. The third
 force was group selection. The population structure of the house mouse
 is one of small local demes. Whenever all the males in one of these
 small groups are homozygous for the t-allele, the entire deme goes ex-
 tinct. Females living in a group all of whose males are homozygous
 will have no offspring. What is more, their fitnesses (or rather the
 component of fitness determined by this selection process) will be 0,
 owing to the fact that they belong to a group of a certain kind. Fe-
 males within such a group may differ in phenotype and genotype as much
 as you like, but such differences make no difference; their reproduc-
 tive chances have been destroyed by their belonging to the kind of
 group they're in. Since the frequency of t-alleles among females in
 such groups will, on average, be higher than the frequency of t-alleles
 among females in groups lacking this fatal flaw, the effect of group
 selection will be to reduce the frequency of the t-allele. Notice that
 in this case, organismic and group selection are in the same direction;
 both work against the t-allele. So one cannot require that group se-
 lection and individual selection always be opposing forces.
 The other example I want to describe in which individual and group
 selection work in the same direction is a group selection experiment
 that Michael Wade (1976) carried out on the flour beetle, Tribolium
 castaneum. Wade's experiment involved setting up and monitoring four
 selection processes at once. In each of them, he started with 48 popu-
 lations, each containing 16 beetles each. At the end of 37 days, he
 did his selecting. In one of the treatments, he selected for large
 populations; he located the population containing the largest number of
 adults and used it to found colonies of 16 individuals each until the
 population was exhausted. He then went to the next largest group and
 did the same, until 48 second generation populations were founded. He
 repeated this process for a number of generations. The average size of
 populations at the end of the selection process was higher than the
 average size of the populations in the first generation. Here we have
 group selection; groups were selected in virtue of their being large.
 Another group selection procedure was carried out on a second set of
 48 populations. Here, Wade selected for small populations. The regi-
 men was as before, and at the end of the procedure the average size was
 much reduced from what it had been at the start.
 A third selection treatment served as a control group. Again, there
 were 48 canisters. At the end of 37 days, one sample of 16 individuals
 was drawn from each canister and used to found a next generation popu-
 lation. The only selection process that took place here was within
 populations. Individuals within a canister competed with each other.
 But, roughly speaking, each group had the same chance of representation
 in the next generation as any other; each contributed one and only one
 colony of 16 individuals. This experimental treatment involved indivi-
 dual selection but no group selection. What happened in the process?
 Under individual selection alone, the average population size declined,
 owing to such factors as lengthened developmental time, reduced
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 fecundity, and increased cannibalism.9
 Now what happened in the control treatment also happened in the two
 group selection treatments just described. That is, within each can-
 ister in the group selection treatments, individual selection was go-
 ing on as well. This force, we learn from the control treatment, pro-
 moted reduction in population size. in the group selection treatment,
 in which there was group selection for reduced population size, there
 were in fact two forces at work. Individual selection promoted reduc-
 tion in population size, and group selection did the same thing. As
 one might expect, the magnitude of the reduction that took place in the
 group selection treatment was greater than that achieved by individual
 selection alone in the control treatment. Two forces are better than
 one. Here we have the same lesson as that obtained in the t-allele
 example. Group selection and individual selection can act in the same
 direction; group selection does not have to be selection for altruism.10
 6. Group Selection Defined
 My purpose in discussing these two examples has not merely been to
 argue that altruism is inessential. In addition, I wanted to add some
 data which may serve to constrain an adequate definition of group selec-
 tion. Let me review the other requirements that a reasonable defini-
 tion should fulfill. First, the definition should allow one to distin-
 guish changes in group properties due to group selection from changes
 in group properties that are due to processes occurring at lower levels
 of organization. That is, an adequate definition should take seriously
 Williams' artefact argument. Secondly, the definition should not have
 the consequence that group selection exists whenever fitness values are
 context sensitive. Group selection does not exist simply in virtue of
 the fact that the fitness values of organisms depend on the character
 of the group they are in. And, thirdly, it should turn out that group
 selection can exist both in the presence or absence of organismic selec-
 tion and can act in the same or opposite direction from it. This last
 consideration combines the rejection of altruism as a criterion of
 group selection with the earlier remarks to the effect that group selec-
 tion should be an objectively distinct force of evolution.
 With this elaborate preamble, the definition can be stated:
 Group selection acts on a set of groups if, and only if, there
 is a force impinging on those groups which makes it the case
 that for each group, there is some property of the group which
 determines one component of the fitness of every member of the
 group.
 Let me try to state the intuitive idea in a less cumbersome way. When
 group selection occurs, all the organisms in the same group are bound
 together by a common fate. As far as this selective force is concerned,
 they are equally fit. What determines these identical fitness values
 (on the component of fitness at issue) is their membership in the same
 group. Individuals with radically different genotypes and phenotypes
 may have identical fitness values, owing to their belonging to the
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 same group. And individuals with identical genotypes and phenotypes
 may have very different fitness values, owing to their belonging to
 different groups. Under group selection, what is causally efficacious
 in the production of reproductive differences among organisms is mem-
 bership in groups of different kinds.
 Let's apply this idea to the examples discussed so far, starting
 with the contrived example of populations in which everyone has the
 same height. Our definition explains why this is not a case of group
 selection. Although every individual in the same group has the same
 fitness value, the cause of this sameness is not common membership in
 a group of a certain kind. A simple explanation is also available of
 why our two pair-wise competitions between Arrowhead and Standard and
 between Chiricahua and Standard in adjacent population cages was not a
 case of group selection. Although the fitness of a fruit fly depended
 on the kind of group it was in, the members of the same group were not
 acted on as a unit. The members of the same group did not have the
 same fitness, on any component of fitness. Rather, group context
 served to determine the differential fitnesses of organisms with the
 group, in just the way that the environment can determine fitness
 differences in cases of ordinary individual selection. Group proper-
 ties existed, but these failed to ramify back on the fitnesses of
 organisms in the appropriate way.
 Our definition also explains why the two cases of group selection
 discussed before do really count as group selection. In the t-allele
 example, every mouse has fitness equal to 0, if it belongs to a group
 all of whose males are homozygous for the t-allele. What is crucial is
 that this common fitness value is caused by common membership in a
 group of a certain kind. The same is true of Wade's selection experi-
 ment. If there is group selection for groups of a certain size, then
 every individual in a group has an equal chance of finding its way into
 the next generation. The individuals within a population are bound to-
 gether, their common fitness values determined by their common member-
 ship in a group of a certain size.
 Before moving on to another example of group selection and to some
 further biological considerations, I want to point out a philosophically
 interesting feature of the definition proposed. The claim that a set
 of groups is subject to group selection will differ from the claim that
 a set of objects is subject to familiar physical forces like gravity or
 electromagnetism. Group selection may take endlessly many different
 physical forms; to say that some populations are undergoing a group
 selection process is not yet to say what physical properties are caus-
 ally efficacious, but rather is just to say that some physical property
 or other is responsible for fitness values in a certain way. In con-
 trast, claiming that a particular physical force is acting on a set of
 objects is a much more specific claim about the physical details; for
 example, to say that a physical object is in an electromagnetic field
 is to say that its charge and its distances from other objects play a
 specific kind of causal role. It is in this sense that claims about
 evolutionary forces can be more "abstract" than claims about physical
 forces. This greater degree of abstractness -- this formulation of
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 generalizations which are true of objects which differ physically from
 each other -- is achieved in evolutionary theory by quantifying over
 properties. Besides the inevitable ontological commitment to numbers
 which any mathematical theory will involve, evolutionary theory is
 thereby Platonistic in an additional respect. This is one reason,
 among others (discussed at greater length in Sober 1981a) for thinking
 that a purely extensional ontology will be unsatisfactory for this sci-
 ence.
 In order to give the reader some further grasp of the phenomenon
 that a definition of group selection is supposed to circumscribe, I
 want to describe another biological example which is often cited (e.g.,
 by Lewontin 1970) as a probable case of group selection. The empirical
 details to be described have biological plausibility, but they may be
 revised or replaced by further information. Our interest, though, is
 not in whether they are true, but in what the assumption of their
 truth tells us about what group selection is.
 Here I have in mind the coevolution in Australia of the disease vi-
 rus myxoma and the rabbit Oryctolagus cuniculus. Myxoma was intro-
 duced into Australia to cut down on the rabbit population. Two fami-
 liar epidemiological events ensued. On the one hand, rabbits became
 more immune to the disease; on the other, the virus became less viru-
 lent. The explanation of the latter change is that the disease is
 spread from rabbit to rabbit by a mosquito which only bites live rab-
 bits. Thus, an extremely virulent strain of myxoma, while it may be-
 come predominant within a single host, runs a good chance of never
 spreading through the rabbit population. Less virulent strains, on
 the other hand, while they succeed in expropriating a smaller number of
 the host's cells, nevertheless increase their chances of transmission.
 Two, opposing, selection forces are at work here. Within each rab-
 bit, strains of greater virulence will tend to consume a greater pro-
 portional share of the limiting resource -- namely the host's own
 cells. So there is individual (within group) selection for increased
 virulence. But a virus winning this race may thereby lose another --
 that of spreading its genes to other rabbits. A virus population --
 the assemblage of different strains within a single rabbit -- founds
 colonies, and roughly speaking, the lower the average virulence of a
 population, the better the chances are that a mosquito will transport a
 colonizing propagule from that population to another host. Assuming
 that these two selection forces are the main evolutionary forces at
 work, the fact that the virus declined in virulence shows that in this
 case the group selection force was stronger than the force of indivi-
 dual selection.
 Less virulent strains of myxoma are "altruists". By being less vir-
 ulent, they reduce their expectation of reproductive success within the
 population they are in, but thereby increase the group's chances of
 survival and reproduction by lowering the average virulence of the pop-
 ulation. This example should correct the popular misconception that
 altruism must always be driven to extinction by a selection process.
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 Evolutionary theory entails no such theorem. Rather, what this example
 shows is that a crucial factor in determining the evolution of a system
 of this kind, in which group and individual selection oppose each other,
 is time. If mosquitoes bit rabbits much more rarely, or if myxoma ex-
 propriated host cells at a much faster rate, the decline in virulence
 of myxoma might never have occurred.
 There is a theorem which represents this general idea, however.
 Fisher's fundamental theorem of natural selection (1930) states that
 the rate of evolution under natural selection is identical to the addi-
 tive genetic variance in fitness. Since the fundamental theorem has to
 do with the rate of evolution, evolution will proceed faster, the
 shorter the generation time of the objects involved. But since groups
 almost always take longer to found new colonies than the individuals
 within the groups take to reproduce themselves, one again has the con-
 sequence that group selection will produce smaller changes than indi-
 vidual selection (Crow and Kimura 1970, Lewontin 1970). In the myxoma
 example, group selection was able to exert a powerful influence pre-
 cisely because of the contingent facts concerning group and individual
 generation times.
 Although I don't want to contest the correctness of applying
 Fisher's theorem in this case, it is important to identify a presuppo-
 sition of using it in the general argument that group selection works
 more slowly than individual selection. It was pointed out earlier
 that the idea of group reproduction standardly used in discussing
 group selection is that of groups founding numerically distinct colo-
 nies. But there is no need to restrict our attention to this process,
 to the exclusion of considering the dynamics of population growth. In-
 deed, the definition of group selection we have arrived at is perfectly
 consistent with a system of groups undergoing a group selection pro-
 cess in which fitter groups increase in relative numbers. The total
 number of groups need not change at all. But if this kind of group
 selection process is considered, the argument based on Fisher's theorem
 cannot be made. Although individuals usually reproduce faster than
 their containing groups found colonies, it isn't quite so ubiquitous
 that individual reproduction takes place in the context of noncoloniz-
 ing groups which are at their carrying capacity. This point leaves
 open the possibility, of course, that other broad differences between
 groups and organisms may be harnessed to Fisher's theorem in support of
 the claim that group selection is a weaker force of evolution than in-
 dividual selection (see, for example, the argument of Lewontin 1970 con-
 cerning heritability).
 Before drawing a few general lessons concerning what the definition
 of group selection implies about general features of the concepts of
 fitness and selection, I want to take up an objection to the proposed
 definition. According to the definition, the members of the same group
 must have precisely the same fitness values (on the component of fit-
 ness at issue) if group selection is at work. But this sounds too
 strong; for example, group selection might exist simply in virtue of
 the fact that membership in groups of different kinds had some
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 percentage effect on some other fitness parameter. For example, each
 member of a particular group might have its overall fitness boosted by
 5% by belonging to a group of a certain kind. What is crucial is uni-
 form effect, in some sense; identical fitness values are not required,
 strictly speaking.
 If a property of a group drives predators away, the individuals in
 the group need not benefit equally. Some might have been better than
 others in evading predators to begin with, and so the removal of dan-
 ger may represent an unequal benefit. Still, this may be a genuine
 case of group selection. If some groups have properties which attract
 predators while others have properties which repel them, a group selec-
 tion process may ensue. Though the numerical increments in fitness
 that members of the same group obtain from the shared group property
 may be unequal, the fundamental causal structure of a group selection
 process is still intact. The group's relation to the predator, in
 this case, is such that the predator reacts to the group as a unit.
 Although the numbers assigned to individuals may not transparently rep-
 resent this, the biological relationship of the group to its predator
 subsumes each individual indifferently. Though fitness values within
 the group may differ, each individual encounters a predator to the de-
 gree that it does because of the property of the group it is in.
 Whether the biologist characterizes this aspect of the ecology in
 terms of a separate component of fitness or views it as a partial de-
 terminant of some more encompassing component is not what matters.
 A number of consequences follow from our discussion concerning the
 concepts of fitness and selection. As soon as fitness is decoupled
 from actual reproductive success, it follows inevitably that one can-
 not read off fitness values from patterns of reproduction. The fact
 that some groups reproduce more than others does not mean that the more
 productive groups are fitter. Nor does the fact that some species
 speciate and persist more than others imply that species selection is
 occurring, or that some species are fitter than others (see Stanley
 1975 and Gould 1980 for discussions of species selection). Fitness
 and selection are both causal concepts; they describe the causes of
 change and not the fact that there has been differential productivity.
 Perhaps a more surprising consequence of our discussion is that fit-
 ness and selection are decoupled from each other. In spite of the fact
 that fitness values and selection coefficients are interdefinable in
 mathematical models (so that, typically, s = 1 - w), there is an impor-
 tant difference between these concepts. As we saw in our simple exam-
 ple of a series of populations which were each internally homogeneous
 for height, the fact that groups differ in fitness does not imply that
 there is group selection. The groups, in this example, differed in
 fitness in that they had different propensities to be reproductively
 successful. But the cause of these fitness differences was individual,
 not group, selection.
 Selection is a richer concept than fitness. In fact, the relation
 of selection to fitness is somewhat like the relation of fitness to
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 actual reproductive success. To say that group selection occurs is to
 say more than simply that groups differ in fitness; it is to say why
 those fitness differences obtain. Selection is the cause of fitness
 differences, just as fitness differences may be the cause of differ-
 ences in actual reproductive success. It follows from this that just
 as one cannot read off the level of selection from facts about differ-
 ential productivity, one cannot read off the level of selection from
 facts about differential fitness. The difference between individual
 and group selection is not the same as that between within-group and
 between-group variance in fitness. By the same token, even if some
 species could be shown to have a greater tendency to speciate, this
 would not suffice to establish the existence of species selection. The
 question that remains unanswered is the causal one of why these differ-
 ences in the expectation of splitting obtain.
 This difference between fitness and selection is not surprising,
 when one considers that fitness is a disposition while natural selec-
 tion is a force. Although the forces at work determine certain dispo-
 sitions in the objects present, the dispositions of those objects do
 not uniquely determine what forces are at work. Thus, to be told that
 two billiard balls are disposed to accelerate toward each other from
 their initial positions is not to say what force or forces endowed the
 objects with that disposition. On the other hand, to specify that the
 two objects generate an electromagnetic field determines one of their
 dispositions to move in certain ways.
 Our analysis also reveals the inadequacy of two lines of argument
 that are sometimes offered in defense of lower-level -- either organ-
 ismic or genic -- selectionism. It is sometimes pointed out that all
 of the alleged higher-level interactions which may obtain owing to pop-
 ulation structure can be given mathematical representation in the fit-
 ness values of individual organisms or of individual genes. That is,
 the effects of processes at higher levels can be viewed as part of the
 environment of genes, and the whole selection story can be told in
 terms of the selection coefficients of individual genes. One criticism
 of this line of thinking is epistemological and, therefore, inconse-
 quential: no one at present knows enough about any gene to define for
 it a selection coefficient which takes account of all this information.
 But this line of attack misses its mark since the proposal does not de-
 scribe what we as theorists can successfully codify, but makes a claim
 about what is going on in nature.
 The fundamental flaw in this kind of argument is that it confuses
 the task of formulating a predictively successful mathematical appara-
 tus with the task of accurately describing the causal structure of se-
 lection processes. It is to be granted that all of the information
 about higher-level selection can be represented in the so-called selec-
 tion coefficients of organisms or genes (Levins 1970, 1975; Wade 1979),
 but that simply does not imply that, in nature, it is individual or
 genic selection which is always occurring. Genes may be modelled as
 maximizing their fitnesses, but that leaves open the question of what
 causal processes propel changes in gene frequencies (Wilson 1980).
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 Earlier, I commented on the fact that the interdefinability of fitness
 values and selection coefficients should not mislead us into thinking
 that fitness and selection are essentially equivalent concepts. The
 same point applies here: it is essential not to confuse facts about
 the mathematics of our models with facts about the causal structure of
 the processes modelled. It is desirable, of course, that our models be
 realistic. But it is a naive realism which thinks that every biologi-
 cally interesting distinction will be forced on us by the exigencies of
 mathematical modelling.
 One last confusion which I hope this discussion lays to rest is that
 between the issue of the unit of selection and the issue of the unit of
 replication (see Hull 1980 and 1981 for discussion). Group selec-
 tionists do not deny that the gene is the mechanism by which biological
 objects pass on their characteristics; the issue of cultural evolution
 is not an issue here. But this shared assumption about the unit of
 replication simply cuts no ice. That genes are passed along leaves
 open the question of what causes their differential transmission (pace
 Dawkins 1976). This is not to say that facts about heritability are
 irrelevant to the question of how selection at different levels may
 produce cumulative evolution (see Lewontin 1970 for this kind of argu-
 ment). But any such argument must do more than merely point out that
 genes are the devices by which characteristics are inherited.
 7. Between Scylla and Charybdis
 The stock market crash, which was a social fact, was caused by mar-
 ket conditions, which constitute other social facts. These market con-
 ditions, in turn, were caused by individual interactions. By transi-
 tivity of causality, the individual interactions caused the stock mar-
 ket crash. If social facts cause something, so do individual facts.
 Once we decide to avoid atomism on the one hand and hypostatis on the
 other, the sensible middle course appears to provide no asymmetry be-
 tween the social and the individual; both are causally efficacious.
 Yet, it is emphatically not the case that if group selection causes
 something, so does individual selection. Group selection and indivi-
 dual selection are objectively distinct forces. Individual selection
 does not require an atomistic view of the organism; it does not require
 one to ignore the fact that organismic fitness is context sensitive.
 Individual selection is a process that a sensible individualist can
 embrace. Similarly, group selection does not require a reification of
 the group; it does not force one to suppose that groups are something
 above and beyond the interactions of their member individuals and the
 environment. Group selection is a process that a sensible holist can
 embrace. And, best of all, it is a substantive empirical question what
 the role and importance of these two forms of selection has been in the
 history of evolution.
 Holism and individualism in the social sciences should have such
 luck. To move beyond truisms to nontrivial empirical issues, holists
 and individualists need to formulate their dispute with reference to
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 specific social forces. Although there is no real question involved in
 asking whether a certain evolutionary outcome was caused by properties
 of groups or by properties of individuals, there is a substantive ques-
 tion involved in asking whether that outcome resulted from individual
 selection or from group selection. In just the same way, societies
 change because of the way their constituent groups interact, and these
 groups, ultimately, are caused to be the way they are by the indivi-
 duals they contain. The debate between holism and individualism might
 become fruitful if specific mechanisms were considered and the question
 were then posed with respect to them: does their impact on individuals
 correspond to the causal structure we have identified in group selection
 processes, or does their activity represent a form of individual selec-
 tion? Although it is probably a mistake to try to mimic the units of
 selection debate too closely, and there is no reason why the holism/in-
 dividualism controversy must be recast in its terms, let's explore, in
 conclusion, what individual and group selection would look like in the
 case of social processes mediated by cultural, rather than genetic,
 evolution.
 Social institutions can be viewed as selection mechanisms. They dis-
 criminate among individuals in virtue of their having certain proper-
 ties and differentially distribute effects on that basis. This descrip-
 tion encompasses a great many, diverse, social processes and appears to
 be nontendentious, in that it is consistent with the outlook of neo-
 classical and Marxist social thought alike.
 As an example, consider a college admissions test. The test discrim-
 inates among individuals, and, on the basis of that discrimination, the
 individual is either admitted or not to a particular college. Is this
 a case of individual or of group selection? The test tests individuals,
 of course, but that doesn't show that it embodies a kind of individual
 selection. And individuals are influenced in their ability to do well
 on the test by the groups to which they belong. But that doesn't show
 that the test is a form of group selection. As we have seen earlier,
 neither the fact that individuals are the material basis of groups nor
 the fact that individual properties are context sensitive suffices to
 decide the issue between individual and group selection.
 The overall ability to do well on the test can presumably be broken
 down into a number of component abilities. Are there component abili-
 ties which an individual has, simply in virtue of its belonging to a
 group of some particular kind? Are the properties of the group which
 have this effect on individual ability the result of interaction among
 individuals? Could two individuals who are otherwise similar differ in
 ability simply in virtue of their belonging to different groups? Could
 two individuals who are otherwise quite different possess the same com-
 ponent ability simply in virtue of their belonging to the same group?
 If the answers to these questions are yes, then the admissions test
 would appear to have the earmarks of a mechanism of group selection.
 Although each of us probably thinks that he or she can readily
 answer the above questions, a note of caution is in order. The
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 mechanisms of selection processes are often difficult to discern, and
 it is a mistake to think that one can conclusively identify the charac-
 ter of a mechanism from the kinds of results it produces. Perhaps the
 admissions test gives greater than proportional representation to some
 particular group; it doesn't follow that the test involves group selec-
 tion for membership in that group. In this case, a serious assessment
 of what the test is doing must be based on a serious understanding of
 the various abilities that affect the ability to do well on the test.
 Characterizing these components is a highly nontrivial task, one which
 we have barely begun to discharge. Although it is transparent that the
 admissions test is a form of selection, the character of this selection
 process is in many ways extremely opaque.
 Another application to social processes that can be made of our dis-
 tinction between group and individual selection involves the idea of
 the selection of selection processes. Besides wanting to answer the
 question of how the admissions test works, one would also like to know
 where it came from -- how it came to be used as the admissions test.
 Even if it were true that the admissions test embodied a form of indi-
 vidual selection, the possibility remains open that it evolved by a
 process of group selection. Perhaps part of the cause of its being
 used is that it has certain group level results; this may be true even
 if the test does not make its discriminations on the basis of group
 membership.
 Marxist critiques of "bourgeois" social science often have two com-
 ponents (Keat and Urry 1977). First, bourgeois social science is al-
 legedly too individualistic in its orientation, seeing the individual
 rather than the group as the correct unit of analysis. Secondly, it is
 claimed to be superficial in the kinds of questions it asks about soci-
 ety, typically focusing on issues concerning the regularities that so-
 cial institutions obey, rather than on more structural questions having
 to do with why those institutions are as they are. These two lines of
 criticism are not unrelated, of course, since, for Marxists, an expla-
 nation of why particular social institutions have the form they do must
 crucially involve considerations of class conflict. From this point of
 view, the results of bourgeois social theory need not be false, but
 they must be incomplete. This means that if they are, mistakenly,
 taken to be complete, they will offer a distorted view of social life.
 One might interpret this point of view as holding that social insti-
 tutions, at least in bourgeois society, embody a form of individual
 selection, but that they evolved by a process of group selection. One
 of the differences between bourgeois and feudal society may consist in
 which properties of individuals determine how social institutions treat
 them. Whereas membership in particular social groups was used to de-
 cide all manner of social sortings out, these criteria are much less
 often the ones which are directly invoked in bourgeois society. Rather,
 the mechanisms have shifted toward the structure of individual selec-
 tion. But this by no means implies that those social institutions do
 not themselves constitute a form of class interest, since they may have
 evolved by a process of group selection. From this point of view,
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 holism and individualism may each be correct in a limited domain, if
 each is understood as claiming that certain sorts of selection proces-
 ses are at work in a given society.
 Although this articulation of the holism versus individualism debate
 is not the only one possible, it does have one virtue. It yields a
 conception of individualism which is untainted by atomism and a concep-
 tion of holism which is unspoiled by hypostatis. In so doing, it turns
 the social science dispute into what it ought to be -- a question about
 the character of social causation which is not decidable by a priori
 argument but can only be addressed by the assessment of evidence and
 the development of theories which are specifically sociological. This
 reformulation makes the dispute harder than it was before; the road
 away from truisms and toward contentful hypotheses about causal mechan-
 isms is never an easy one. But this presumably is a price that an ex-
 planatory science willingly pays.
 Notes
 I am very grateful to James Crow, David Hull, Richard Lewontin, and
 William Wimsatt. Discussions with them have been invaluable to me in
 developing my ideas on evolutionary theory in general and on group se-
 lection in particular. The research discussed here was supported by
 the John Simon Guggenheim Foundation and by the Graduate School of the
 University of Wisconsin, Madison. I also wish to thank the Museum of
 Comparative Zoology, Harvard University, for its hospitality during
 1980-81.
 2The argument presented in Putnam (1975) and Fodor (1976) against
 identifying psychological and physical properties may be applicable to
 the relationship between social properties and the properties of indi-
 vidual psychology. Just as a given psychological property may be
 "multiply realizable" in indefinitely many physical forms, so a given
 social property may have indefinitely many realizations at the level of
 individual psychology. For an application of this line of thinking to
 the relationship of biological properties like fitness to physical prop-
 erties, see Rosenberg (1978).
 3The present discussion of holism and individualism and of causality
 assumes the truth of determinism, but this assumption is not essential
 to the points at issue. If quantum mechanical states at one time do
 not uniquely determine such states at a later time, then, on the as-
 sumption that macro-states are token/token identical with quantum me-
 chanical states, it follows that macro-states at one time do not deter-
 mine macro-states at a later time. Thus, from the point of view of
 causal determination, not only will facts about individuals fail to
 causally determine social facts; it will also be true that earlier so-
 cial facts fail to causally determine later social facts. So, if both
 holism and individualism are construed as making claims which imply
 that social facts are causally determined (but disagree about what does
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 the determining), then both are mistaken. However, there still is
 scope for two other issues to be raised. First, if causality does not
 require causal determination (as in the theories of causality of
 Dretske and Snyder 1972 and of Mackie 1974), then it still is possible
 for social facts to be caused by individual facts, and for social facts
 to cause other social facts, as required above. Secondly, besides the
 question of the causal connections between and within levels, there is
 the possibility of identity relations obtaining between social and in-
 dividual facts (and between macro- and micro-facts generally). This
 second possibility is enough to allow the holism and individualism
 issue to be addressed, even if the question of causality is set to one
 side.
 It is sometimes remarked that for selection to act on a set of ob-
 jects, the objects must share a "common environment." I take it that
 this concept of a common environment is not definable in terms of
 spatio-temporal proximity, but will involve the idea that some causal
 influence affects the objects involved. (This includes, of course, the
 idea that they affect each other.) Even so, the requirement of a com-
 mon environment still appears to represent too stringent a demand on
 the concept of natural selection. For consider again two prey popula-
 tions which are geographically isolated from each other; suppose that
 they are preyed upon by two different populations of predators. If the
 two prey populations are conspecific, and the two predator populations
 are too, it may be appropriate to view the individuals in both prey
 populations as participating in a single selection process. The ob-
 jects in a single selection process must be acted on by agents which
 are qualitatively similar, not necessarily numerically identical.
 In this paper, I will construe Williams' artefact argument as favor-
 ing individual selection hypotheses at the expense of group selection
 hypotheses. This does less than full justice to Williams' considered
 position, in which genic, rather than organismic, selection is the
 preferred level. However, a detailed discussion of genic selection
 must be postponed for another occasion.
 In the light of this argument, consider the common definition of
 group selection reported in Wade's (1978) review article: "Group selec-
 tion is defined as that process of genetic change which is caused by
 differential extinction or proliferation of groups of organisms." Note
 that, besides failing to distinguish group from individual selection,
 this definition, taken at its word, fails to distinguish group selec-
 tion from drift.
 I take it that this point undermines the definition of group selec-
 tion presented in Wimsatt (1980, p. 236): "A unit of selection is any entity
 for which there is heritable context-independent variance in fitness
 among entities at that level which does not appear as heritable context-
 independent variance in fitness (and thus, for which the variance fit-
 ness is context-dependent) at any lower level of organization." As I
 understand it, this definition would imply that in our two pair-wise
 competitions between Arrowhead and Standard in one cage and between
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 Chiricahua and Standard in the other, we do not have a case of organ-
 ismic, individual, selection. The reason is that the fitnesses of
 organisms in this situation are context-dependent.
 For more refined definitions of altruism, see Wilson (1980).
 9Wade's fourth treatment he calls "random selection". Each canister
 is assigned a number and then a canister is chosen by picking a number
 at random. The chosen group is then used to found colonies of 16 until
 it is exhausted, at which point another canister is chosen at random.
 This is repeated until 48 next generation colonies are established.
 Although this process can be called "group selection", according to the
 definition of group selection used (see my footnote 6 above), it is not
 group selection, according to the definition to be presented in what
 follows. Moreover, if drift and selection are mutually distinct cate-
 gories, it is hard to see how there could be such a thing as "random
 selection" at all.
 It is worth pointing out that if Wade's experiment provides genuine
 cases of group selection, then group selection need not involve groups
 with complex organizational properties or ones having especially intri-
 cate forms of sociality. Although interest in group selection sparked
 by the issue of altruism will naturally focus on such cases, this is
 not a consequence of the concept of group selection itself. Wade's
 group selection treatments selected for group properties which are ab-
 solutely universal when there are groups at all. Of course, even
 though it is no problem finding groups which vary in size, it is not
 quite so inevitable that this variation is heritable. This further
 requirement, as noted in Section 2, is needed if the selection process
 is to result in cumulative evolutionary change.
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